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CONGRESSIONAL ACTION TO AMEND
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 702:
A MISCHIEVOUS ATTEMPT TO CODIFY
DAUBERT v. MERRELL DOW
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.
The role of science and technology in criminal and civil trials has
presented unique challenges to the judicial system since the first recorded
use of an expert witness in 1782.1 Today the problem of the admissibility
of scientific evidence is compounded by the availability of thousands of
scientific studies to prove a party's case.2 One of the principal dilemmas
confronting judges today is conflicting evidence produced by different
witnesses on the same issue.3
1. Folkes v. Chadd, 99 Eng. Rep. 589, 589-90 (1782) (marking one of the first refer-
ences to an expert witness called by a party).
See generally Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert
Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REv. 40, 43-45 (1901) (tracing the use of expert witnesses). From
the beginning there appeared to be some dissatisfaction and distrust of the use of experts:
It was to be expected that former generations of judges and lawyers trained in
older precedents and practices who recognized the appearance in the courts of an
expert witness as an innovation would look with suspicion and doubt on such
testimony. While the principles on which such evidence is introduced have come
to be well recognized and while the profession no longer has any reservation in
approving theoretically of the use of expert testimony, yet, on the other hand,
there is a constant complaining and mistrust on the part of judges, juries and
lawyers of the expert witness.
Lee M. Friedman, Expert Testimony, Its Abuse and Reformation, 19 YALE L.J. 247, 247
(1910); see also David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door,
Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying About the Future of
Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 1799, 1800 nn.2-3 (1994) (discussing different
views of expert testimony during the early nineteenth century).
2. Attorney Accountability: Hearings on H.R. 10 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and
Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 146 (1995)
(statement of Dr. Franklin M. Zweig, Pres., Einstein Institute for Science, Health & the
Courts) [hereinafter Hearings]. Dr. Zweig testified on Section 102, the Honesty in Evi-
dence Act, part of H.R. 10, the Common Sense Legal Reforms Act of 1995. In 1992, Dr.
Zweig directed a random sample survey of state court judges entitled, "Independent, Neu-
tral Scientific Information and Experts for the State Courts." One of the major problems
reported by these judges was conflicting evidence produced by different witnesses on the
same evidence. Id. at 147.
3. In a survey of federal and state judges conducted by Dr. Zweig for the 1994 Na-
tional Conference on Mass Torts, 53% of the 106 judges surveyed found assessing scientific
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Currently, society is experiencing an enormous expansion of scientific
studies and discoveries, ranging from new synthetic chemicals and ad-
vanced industrial processes to the increased accuracy of, Deox-
yribonucleic Acid (DNA) in forensic science behavior.4 As science
continues to progress, the legal system must develop coherent standards
for the management of scientific evidence in federal and state courts.5 : It
is likely that the debate over the admissibility of scientific evidence will
continue to challenge the judicial system until the parameters of science
and law are defined more clearly.
In 1993, the United States Supreme Court considered the general ques-
tion of the admissibility of scientific evidence in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.6 Twenty-two amicus briefs were filed dealing with
various definitions of scientific knowledge, scientific methods, scientific
validity, and peer review.7 Although the Court provided four factors to
aid judges in determining the admissibility of scientific evidence, the deci-
sion did not address numerous procedural problems.' The Court's failure
to apply its own reasoning to whether the scientific testimony in the case
validity in testimony among the most difficult problems in dealing with expert testimony.
Id. at 147. Additionally, toxic substance litigation was expected to increase with respect to
20 toxic substances and to decrease in regard to only five substances. Id.
4. See Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REV.
1481, 1485 and n.15 (1995).
5. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 147. The 1993 report of the Carnegie Commission
on Science, Technology and Government, which conducted a five year study of the courts,
found that due to the complexity of cases before the court, additional assistance with inter-
preting scientific evidence, concepts, and material was warranted. Id. at 147. Likewise, the
1990 study by the Federal Courts Study Committee recommended additional attention to
science. Id.
6. 509 U.S. 579, 585 (1993).
7. Id. at 598 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The Daubert
majority viewed peer review as one pertinent consideration in determining whether, the
expert's testimony is scientifically valid and whether the scientific reasoning or methodol-
ogy can be applied or to understand or determine the facts at issue. Id. at 593. One aspect
of peer review would be publication in a journal reviewed by the relevant scientific com-
munity. Id. The Court stated that submission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is
viewed as a part of "good science" because publication helps to insure that flaws in meth-
odology will be discovered. Id. at 592-93. The Court did acknowledge that publication or
the lack of publication should not be "dispositive." Id. at 594.
8. The trial judge is required to make a two-step preliminary assessment under Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 104(a): (1) "whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the
testimony is scientifically valid" and (2) "whether that reasoning or methodology properly
can be applied to the facts in issue." Id. at 592. The Court provided a list of factors for the
trial judge to consider, but cautioned that this list should not be considered definitive.
These factors are: (1) whether the scientific methodology can be or has been tested; (2)
whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3)
whether the scientific technique has a known error rate and standards controlling its opera-
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was admissible has led to confusion and controversy. 9
This Note analyzes how the judicial system has attempted to regulate
the admissibility of scientific evidence and identifies the strengths and
weaknesses of the current test for the admissibility of expert testimony
under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 ("Rule 702").1° Next, this Note ex-
amines the impact of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. on
the admissibility of scientific evidence at the federal and state level. Fi-
nally, this Note concludes that the legislative solutions proposed by Con-
gress to amend the language of Rule 702 will not achieve the goal of
"restor[ing] accountability, efficiency, and fairness to our federal civil jus-
tice system.""
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND: THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF NOVEL SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
A. The Frye Test
.The general standard for the admissibility of expert testimony re-
mained stable from the middle of the nineteenth century until the 192312
tion exist; and, (4) whether the technique or theory has gained widespread acceptance in
the scientific community. Id. at 593-94.
9. Id. at 598, 600 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "Ques-
tions arise simply from reading this part of the Court's opinion, and countless more ques-
tions will surely arise when hundreds of district judges try to apply its teaching to particular
offers of expert testimony." Id. at 600.
10. The text of Rule 702 was enacted by Congress without change and provides: "If
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EVID, 702; see 56 F.R.D. 282 (1973); see also Michael H.
Gottesman, Should Federal Evidence Rules Trump State Tort Policy? The Federalism Val-
ues Daubert Ignored, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1837, 1855-58 (1994) (discussing the intent of
Congress and the Advisory Committee with regard to the interpretation of Federal Rule of
Evidence 702).
11. Hearings, supra note 2, at 19 (statement of Hon. James Ramstad, U.S. House of
Representatives). Congressman James Ramstad chaired the 10 member Republican task
force responsible for drafting H.R. 10 entitled, "Common Sense Legal Reforms Act." This
bill was one of 10 bills that made up the Republican "Contract With America." Id. at 18-
19. Congressman Ramstad remarked to the House Judiciary Subcommittee in his intro-
duction of H.R. 10 that:
[T]he "Common Sense Legal Reforms Act," provides concrete steps to restore
accountability, efficiency and fairness to our federal civil justice system .... In
addition, H.R. 10 reforms Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence so that ex-
pert testimony is not admissible unless based on scientifically valid reasoning, per
the Supreme Court's 1993 Daubert case, to exclude "junk science."
Id. at 19-20.
12. David L. Faigman et al., supra note 1, at 1803.
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decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia in Frye v. United States.13 Before Frye, the admission of scientific
evidence focused on the assumption that the superior experience and
training of the expert would permit a presentation to the court and jury of
the significance of scientific tests that laymen could not be expected to
comprehend. 4 Expertise was implied from the individual's superior
qualifications and, in many cases, was based on the degree of professional
success the expert enjoyed.' 5 Prior to the twentieth century, the courts
did not evaluate separately whether a particular body of knowledge sci-
entifically was accepted. 6 The admission of expert testimony rested
solely on the expert's qualifications.'"
Although there was discussion of the problems posed by expert testi-
mony and the use of conflicting scientific evidence in the late nineteenth
century,' 8 the decision in Frye v. United States began a new era of judicial
regulation of scientific evidence.' 9 In Frye, the scientific evidence in con-
troversy was related to the use of a new systolic blood pressure deception
test.z° This evidence was to support the innocent plea of a defendant
13. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
14. Faigman et al., supra note 1, at 1803. In the 1500's experts were part of the jury.
Id. at 1800 n.2. The basic test for the admissibility of expert testimony in the 1800's was
summarized as:
The practice of the courts is to admit the testimony of a class of witnesses who are
not supposed to have personal knowledge of any facts or circumstances bearing
upon a pending case, but on the assumption that they are able from their special
training and experience to apply scientific tests and present to the court and jury
the import and value of such evidence as may appear, which laymen could not be
expected to comprehend and properly estimate.
Id. at 1803 (citing John B. Chapin, Experts and Expert Testimony, 22 ALB. L.J. 365 (1880).
15. Id. at 1804 (explaining what the authors refer to as the commercial market place
test).
16. Id. at 1805 (explaining that the expert and the scientific knowledge were not
viewed separately).
17. Id.
18. Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search For
Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715, 722 (1994) (citing William L. Foster, Expert
Testimony, - Prevalent Complaints and Proposed Remedies, 11 HARV. L. REV. 169 (1897)
(maintaining that conflicting expert testimony caused more confusion than clarity); Lee M.
Friedman, supra note 1, at 247-49 (detailing problems with expert medical testimony and
discussing proposed reforms). See generally Hand, supra note 1, at 54-56 (discussing the
difficulty of the jury in arriving at the truth when conflicting expert testimony is offered).
19. See Black et al., supra note 18, at 722.
20. Frye, 293 F. at 1013-14. The systolic blood pressure deception test was a primitive
type of lie-detector test. At the time there were no polygraphers and the technique was
new. Even today, polygraph expert testimony is generally admitted only on stipulation by
the parties. Faigman et al., supra note 1, at 1805-06 n.20.
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charged with murder.21 In excluding the evidence, the D.C. Circuit based
the admissibility of the lie-detector test on whether the principle on which
the evidence was based was "sufficiently established to have gained gen-
eral acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."22 In sum, the
Frye rule required expert opinion based on novel scientific evidence to
have gained "general acceptance" by a large scientific group.23
The "general acceptance" standard of Frye did not invoke particular
scrutiny or wide-spread use until almost a quarter of a century after the
decision was rendered.24 However, by the 1970's the Frye "general ac-
ceptance" standard for admissibility of scientific evidence was applied
widely in federal and state courts.25 Criticism of the Frye standard, how-
ever, centered on its restrictiveness and uncertainty regarding when a sci-
entific proposition has gained general acceptance.26 The Frye standard
barred the admission of many types of novel scientific evidence because it
was not yet acknowledged widely in the scientific community.27 Other
21. Frye, 293 F. at 1013-14.
22. Id. at 1014. Judge Van Orsdel's solution on how to deal with this novel scientific
evidence departed only slightly from the prior law. His short, two-page opinion stated:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experi-
mental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight
zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts
will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must
be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs.
Id.
23. See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v.
United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1205 (1980) (suggesting that
the rule was designed to apply to criminal cases).
24. See Faigman et al., supra note 1, at 1808 n.25 (quantifying the number of times
Frye has been cited in the past 25 years since the decision). For a decade after the decision,
Frye was not cited by either a federal or a state court, nor were any law review articles
written about it. Id. A review of Shepard's Federal Citations indicated that Frye was cited
"17 times through 1953, and only 5 times prior to World War II." Black et al., supra note
18, at 722 n.30. With the increase in the use of scientific evidence, citations to Frye in-
creased. For example, Frye was cited 470 times during the 1980s and 350 times in the early
1990s. Id.
25. Faigman et al., supra note 1, at 1808. See Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (Md.
1978) (declaring the Frye test to be the standard in most state courts considering the admis-
sibility of scientific evidence). Frye was applied only in criminal cases for the next sixty
years. In federal appellate court, the Frye test first was applied to a civil case in 1984.
Gottesman, supra note 10, at 1837-38 n.6.
26. Faigman et al., supra note 1, at 1816.
27. See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 363 (4th ed.
1992). "Voice stress analysis, voice spectrograms, ion microprobe mass spectroscopy, infra-
red sensing of aircraft, retesting of breath samples for alcohol content, and psychological
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commentaries supported a more stringent standard, claiming that "junk
science" had no place in the courtroom. 28 Support of the Frye standard
also centered on the view that scientists were more qualified than judges
or juries to assess the reliability of scientific evidence.29
Application of the Frye standard can be difficult. Under Frye, the
court must: (1) identify the specific scientific principle, method, theory, or
technique offered by the proponent; (2) define the particular field in
which the scientific principle is to be generally accepted; and, (3) deter-
mine what demonstrates acceptance.3° Courts differed on who was the
relevant community for acceptance and what that community was to
approve. 3'
B. The Federal Rules of Evidence
In 1975, Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence which
adopted a less restrictive approach towards the admission of evidence,
and gave trial court judges broader discretionary power to screen evi-
dence.32 The approach of Rule 702 presented a sharp contrast to the Frye
profiles of battered women, and child abusers" were all excluded in jurisdictions that fol-
lowed the Frye standard. Id.
28. See PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM
2-3 (1991). Huber defines "junk science" as a "catalog of every conceivable kind of error:
data dredging, wishful thinking, truculent dogmatism, and, now and again, outright fraud."
Id. Huber opposes what he refers to as the liberal "let-it-all-in" approach, defining "good
science" as "the science of publication, replication, and verification, the science of consen-
sus and peer review." Id. at 228. Huber advocates that:
[J]unk science is matched by what might be called liability science, a speculative
theory that expects lawyers, judges and juries to search for causes at the far
fringes of science and beyond. The legal establishment has adjusted rules of evi-
dence accordingly, so that almost any self-styled scientist, no matter how strange
or iconoclastic his views, will be welcome to testify in court. The same scientific
questions are litigated again and again, in one courtroom after the next, so that
error is almost inevitable.
Id. at 3. But cf. Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo's Retort: Peter Huber's Junk Scholarship, 42
AM. U. L. REV. 1637, 1722-26 (1993) (critiquing Huber's book as "junk scholarship").
29. See People v. Barbara, 255 N.W.2d 171, 193-94 (Mich. 1977)(advocating that ex-
perts form a type of "technical jury, which must first pass on the scientific status of a
procedure before the lay jury utilizes it in making its findings of fact.") Id. at 194.
30. Black et al., supra note 18, at 727-34.
31. Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, supra note 4, at 1486. A
major difficulty with the general acceptance test is identification by the courts of the "perti-
nent field" in which to evaluate the scientific evidence when it overlaps into more than one
discipline or subspecialty. Giannelli, supra note 23, at 1208-11.
32. Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, supra note 4, at 1486-87;
See FED. R. EVID. 401, 402. Rule 402 provides that "[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible,
except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress,
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test, which required acceptance by a majority of the scientific community
before. novel scientific evidence could be admitted. Rule 702, which gov-
erns expert testimony, provides: "If scientific, technical, or other special-
ized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowl-
edge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise."33 No mention is made in the text of
Rule 702 or in the Advisory Committee Notes as to whether or not the
Frye "general acceptance" standard is to be a prerequisite for
admissibility.34
After the adoption of Rule 702, some courts continued to apply the
Frye test, while other courts followed Rule 702 which embraced a "gen-
eral approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to 'opinion' testi-
mony."35 The United States Courts of Appeal for the Second, Third and
Fifth Circuits held that the. Frye "general acceptance" standard did not
survive the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence.36 In contrast, the
Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits held that the validity of the Frye test
continued to be in tact, despite the enactment of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.37 Thus, the enactment of Rule 702 created uncertainty and dis-
agreement among the circuits as to the status of the "general acceptance"
by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." FED. R. EvID. 402. Rule 401
defines relevant evidence as "having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401.
33. FED. R. EVID. 702.
34. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1234 (3d Cir. 1985); see also Federal
Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 282 (1973)
(indicating that there is no reference to the Frye standard in the Advisory Committee's
Note on Rule 702).
35. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988).
36. See United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 794-97 (2d Cir. 1992)(rejecting the
Frye test); cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 104 (1992); Downing, 753 F.2d at 1232-37 (asserting that
Frye should not be used as the controlling test of admissibility); Deluca v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 955 (3d Cir. 1990) (dismissing the "general accept-
ance" standard); Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1987) (assuming
Frye test did not survive adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 703).
37. Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 4, at 1487-88, 1488 n.36; see also
United States v. Metzger, 778 F.2d 1195, 1203 (6th Cir. 1985) (asserting that the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit follows the Frye "general acceptance test");
United States v. Gillespie, 852 F.2d 475, 480-82 (9th Cir. 1988) (excluding testimony that
did not meet the Frye standard); United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 350-51 (7th Cir.
1989) (asserting the Frye test survived the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
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Frye test.38
C. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.39 to resolve the division among the circuits regard-
ing the standard for the admission of expert testimony.4" In Daubert, the
Court outlined a new test for the admissibility of scientific evidence. 4
Daubert began when two minor children and their parents sued in Cali-
fornia state court.4z Jason Daubert and Eric Schuller were born with limb
reduction birth defects allegedly caused as a result of their pregnant
mother's ingestion of Bendectin, an anti-nausea drug manufactured by
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.43 The defendant removed the suit to the
United States District Court for the Southern District of California based
on diversity of citizenship." After extensive discovery, Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals moved for summary judgment claiming that the plain-
tiffs failed to establish an issue of material fact concerning causation be-
cause they were unable to present admissible evidence that Bendectin
caused birth defects in humans.45 The defendant submitted an affidavit
by Steven H. Lamm, a well-known expert on the risks from exposure of
chemical substances. Lamm asserted that none of the more than thirty
published studies established that Bendectin was a teratogen, a substance
generally capable of causing limb reduction defects.46
The plaintiffs did not dispute the published scientific reports on
Bendectin. The plaintiffs responded, however, with the testimony of
eight scientific experts who concluded that Bendectin can be a teratogen
38. Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 4, at 1491.
39. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
40. Id. at 585.
41. Id. at 592-95.
42. Id. at 582.
43. Id. at 582.
44. Id.
45. Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 571; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582. "Summary judgment is
proper 'after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial ... ' Daubert, 727 F.
Supp. at 571. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). Plaintiffs have
the burden of proof. Id. The court must decide "'whether a fair-minded jury could return
a verdict for the plaintiff [based] on the evidence presented."' Id. (citing Anderson et al. v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc. et al., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)).
46. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582.
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that can cause birth defects. 7 These conclusions were based on three
types of studies: (1) in vitro (test tube) and in vivo (live) animal studies
that established a link between Bendectin and malformations; (2) phar-
macological chemical structure analysis that showed similarities in the
structure of Bendectin and other substances that cause malformations;
and, (3) reanalysis of previously published epidemiological (human statis-
tical) studies. 8
The district court granted the motion for summary judgment, conclud-
ing that a necessary requirement for the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence is that it must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in its field. 9 The district court maintained that expert testi-
mony that is not based on data reasonably relied on by experts in that
particular field is "not helpful, but instead is confusing or misleading and
should, therefore, be excluded."5
The experts for the plaintiffs combined a number of theories to estab-
lish a causal nexus between Bendectin and limb reduction birth defects.51
The district court maintained, however, that in light of the vast amount of
epidemiological data regarding Bendectin, expert opinion that is not
based on epidemiological evidence was not admissible to establish causa-
tion.52 Thus, only the plaintiffs' epidemiological evidence, which was
based on a reanalysis of previously published epidemiological studies,
could be admitted.53 Applying the Frye general acceptance standard, the
district court ruled that the reanalysis was inadmissible because the data
presented by the plaintiffs' experts had not been published or subjected
to peer review.54
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also applied
the "general acceptance" standard of Frye and affirmed the district
court.55 The Ninth Circuit relied on the decisions of other appellate
courts which refused to admit reanalysis of epidemiological studies that
47. Id. at 583. See Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 573-75 (describing the qualifications of the
experts who offered testimony on the behalf of the plaintiff).
48. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 583.
49. Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 572 (quoting United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510
(9th Cir. 1978)).
50. Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 572.
51. Id. at 574-75.
52. Id. at 575.
53. Id.
54. Id. See Gottesman, supra note 10, at 575.
55. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 951 F.2d 1128, 1129, 1131 (9th Cir.
1991).
1997]
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were not published or subjected to peer review to evaluate the risks of
Bendectin.56 The Ninth Circuit stated that reanalysis is accepted by the
scientific community only when it has been subjected to evaluation by
other experts in the field.57 According to the Ninth Circuit, the testimony
offered by the plaintiff failed to establish a sufficient foundation to permit
admission of expert, testimony to show that Bendectin caused the limb
reduction injuries.58 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment
in favor of Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, stating that expert opinion,
which is based on scientific evidence, is inadmissible unless the methods
are "generally accepted" in the scientific community.59
In 1993, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit,
declaring that the rigid, general acceptance test of Frye was at odds with
the "liberal thrust" of the Federal Rules of Evidence and should not be
applied in the federal courts.6" The Court arrived at this holding by fo-
cusing its analysis on the plain language of Rule 702 and the legislative
intent behind the Federal Rules of Evidence. 6'
The Court concluded that the Federal Rules of Evidence require that
the trial judge ensure that all scientific testimony and evidence is both
reliable and relevant.62 The test of admissibility of scientific evidence
enunciated by the Court is tied closely to the literal language in Rule 702
which states: "If the scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experi-
56. Id. at 1130-31. The court cited four circuits that would not permit plaintiffs to rely
on reanalysis of epidemiological studies that had not been either published or subjected to
peer review. Id. (citing Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir.
1988); Lynch v. Merrell-National Labs., 830 F.2d 1190, 1193-96 (1st Cir. 1987); Christopher-
sen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1111 n.8 (5th Cir. 1991); Brock v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 312-13 (5th Cir. 1989). The Ninth Circuit noted that
the plaintiffs' expert testimony in Brock was not held to be inadmissible, but insufficient to
support the jury's verdict. Id. at 1130 n.1.
57. Id. at 1131.
58. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs do not comply with the standard for
admissibility because they were "unpublished, not subjected to the normal peer review
process and generated solely for use in litigation." Id.
59. Id. at 1129-30 (citing Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
60. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588. The history of the Federal Rules of Evidence does not
mention the rigid Frye standard. Id. at 588. The general approach of the Federal Rules of
Evidence is one of "'relaxing the traditional barriers to 'opinion testimony.'"' Id. (quoting
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainy, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
61. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588-89; see Faigman et al., supra note 1, at 1811-13 (analyzing
the Advisory Committee notes, Congressional committee reports, and the hearings on the
Federal Rules of Evidence).
62. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
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ence, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion
or otherwise." 63
The Court reasoned that the test for admissibility of evidence under
Rule 702 focuses on the reliability or trustworthiness of the scientific
studies or data.64 Analyzing the language of Rule 702, the Court con-
cluded that the term "scientific" requires that the evidence be grounded
in the methods and procedures of science.65 The' term "knowledge" in
Rule 702 was defined by the Court as "more than subjective belief or
unsupported speculation., 66 The Court asserted that knowledge is "any
body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good
grounds" but which may not necessarily be "known" to a certainty as
there are no certainties in science.67 Thus, the Court concluded that "the
requirement that an expert's testimony pertain to 'scientific knowledge'
establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability."68
The Court then analyzed the language of the second part of Rule 702,
requiring a relevancy or "helpfulness" determination.69 This part of the
inquiry focused on the probative value and relevance of the data in assist-
ing the fact finder.7 ° The Court asserted that the scientific evidence must
have a valid connection or "fit",71 that is "sufficiently tied to the facts of
the case so that it will assist the jury in resolving a factual issue in
dispute. 72
The Supreme Court presented a list of four factors to guide the trial
court judge in determining whether the underlying methodology or rea-
soning of the testimony is scientifically valid, and whether it can be ap-
plied to the facts at issue in the case. The Court referred to trial court
judges as evidentiary "gatekeepers" 73 and identified the following factors
63. FED. R. EVID. 702.
64. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 n.9.
65. Id. at 590.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 590 & n.9 (distinguishing validity and reliability from the Court's reference
to evidentiary reliability or trustworthiness); see David E. Bernstein, The Admissibility of
Scientific Evidence After Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 15 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2139, 2142 (1994).
69. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591.
70. Id.
71. See id. (discussing "fit" analysis of James E. Starrs, Frye v. United States Restruc-
tured and Revitalized: A Proposal to Amend Federal Evidence Rule 702, 26 JURIMETRICS J.
249 (1986)).
72. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242
(3d Cir. 1985)).
73. Id. at 597.
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to assist judges in determining whether the scientific evidence is suffi-
ciently reliable and relevant: (1) whether the theory or technique can be
tested, refuted, or falsified;74 (2) whether the theory or method was sub-
jected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of
error for the scientific technique; and (4) whether the method or theory
has acquired "general acceptance."75
Although the Supreme Court clarified that the common law "general
acceptance" standard was superseded by Rule 702, the Daubert decision
has led to confusion.76 Missing from the decision was clarity regarding
the procedure that the lower courts were to follow in applying the relia-
bility analysis under Rule 702. The Supreme Court provided only ab-
stract, general guidance about how the lower courts should handle
admissibility of scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence.77
The Court did not apply the general guidelines it outlined to the facts of
the case. Instead, it chose to remand the case to the Ninth Circuit for a
determination of whether the testimony was grounded on a reliable foun-
dation and was relevant.78
Some commentators predicted confusion regarding how federal judges
would apply the general guidelines in Daubert.79 In the dissent, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stevens, characterized the Court's
general observations regarding how federal judges are to screen expert
testimony for relevance and reliability as "vague and abstract."8 Chief
Justice Rehnquist concluded that there was "no doubt that Rule 702 con-
fides to the judge some gatekeeping responsibility."81 This responsibility
requires that federal judges must be satisfied that the scientific evidence
meets a particular standard of reliability and relevance before it is admit-
74. Id. at 593-94 (citing C. Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science 49 (1966)). "'[Tlhe
statements constituting a scientific explanation must be capable of empirical test."' Id.
(citing K. POPPER, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge 371
(5th ed. 1989)).
75. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
76. See Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, supra note 4, at 1488
(analyzing the problems left unresolved by the Daubert Court).
77. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 598 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
78. Id. at 597-98.
79. John S. Mills, Case Comment: Daubert V. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. on
Remand: The Ninth Circuit Loses Its Way in the "Brave New World," 29 GA. L. REV. 849
(1995); see also David E. Bernstein, Daubert One Year Later, 2 (1995)(unpublished manu-
script on file with author).
80. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 598 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
81. Id. at 600.
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ted.82 However, Chief Justice Rehnquist accurately predicted that nu-
merous questions and confusion would arise as district judges tried to
apply the Court's opinion.83 Specifically, he questioned how active a role
federal judges would be required to take in assessing scientific reliability
under the "gatekeeping responsibility" asserted in Daubert.
The uncertainty surrounding the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert
immediately became apparent. On remand, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was required to determine whether the sci-
entific testimony that Bendectin caused limb reduction defects rested on
a reliable foundation and also whether the evidence was relevant to the
-issues in the case.' The Ninth Circuit criticized the Supreme Court for
putting federal judges, who generally are untrained in science, in the posi-
tion of having to resolve disputes among "respected, well-credentialed
scientists about matters squarely within their expertise, in areas where
there is no scientific consensus as to what is and what is not 'good
science."' 85
The Ninth Circuit chose to disregard the framework established by the
Supreme Court in determining the reliability of the evidence under Rule
702.86 Although the Supreme Court identified four factors that federal
judges can apply to assess scientific evidence under Rule 702, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that some of these factors would be difficult to apply to
the present case. The Ninth Circuit then proceeded to craft its own crite-
ria for assessing reliability.8 7 The Ninth Circuit asserted that there are
two principle ways the proponent of expert testimony can demonstrate
that evidence satisfies the first prong of Rule 702: "[1] that an expert's
proffered testimony grows out of pre-litigation research or [2] that the
82. Id. at 589.
83. See Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, supra note 4, at 1514-16
(detailing three avoidance techniques employed by some judges to avoid their gatekeeping
responsibilities).
84. 43 F.3d 1311, 1313 (9th Cir. 1995).
85. Id. at 1316.
86. See Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, supra note 4, at 1516
(providing that the Ninth Circuit's review of Daubert on remand is an example of evasive
techniques judges utilize "to craft their own criteria haphazardly, disregarding the intent of
the current doctrinal framework").
87. Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1317 n.4, 1318. "Two of the four factors mentioned by the
Supreme Court would be difficult or impossible to apply to the expert testimony in this
case." Id. "These factors raise many questions.. Such questions only underscore the basic
problem, which is that we must devise standards for acceptability where respected scien-
tists disagree on what's acceptable." Id. at 1316-17 n.3.
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expert's research has been subject to peer review." 88
Thus, rather than inquiring into the scientific principles and methodol-
ogy of the testimony offered by the experts to satisfy the first. prong or
reliability test of Rule 702, the Ninth Circuit weighed heavily the motiva-
tion behind the research and whether the scientific evidence had been
subjected to peer review. 89 According to the Ninth Circuit, if the prof-
fered evidence failed to meet these two standards, then the proponent of
expert scientific testimony may meet its burden of proof by:
point[ing] to some objective source-a learned treatise, the pol-
icy statement of a professional association, a published article in
a reputable scientific journal or the like-to show that they have
followed the scientific method, as it is practiced by (at least) a
recognized minority of scientists in their field.90
In Daubert, application of the reliability factors fashioned by the Ninth
Circuit was fatal for the plaintiffs. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the
plaintiffs' experts based their testimony on research conducted after they
were hired for Bendectin litigation, and thus the evidence failed to meet
the "pre-litigation" research requirement. 9' Next, the Ninth Circuit
found that the expert testimony failed to satisfy the requirement that the
scientists subject their research to peer review through publication.92 Fi-
nally, the court concluded that the scientific evidence offered by the
plaintiffs failed the reliability test because "they neither explain[ed] the
methodology the experts followed to reach their conclusions nor
point[ed] to any external source to validate that methodology."93
The court excluded the evidence presented by Dr. Palmer, who testi-
fied "'that Bendectin did cause the limb defects in each of the chil-
dren."'94 Because Dr. Palmer offered no tested or testable theory
regarding his method for determining that no other potential cause pro-
duced the birth defects, the court held that his testimony was "[p]ersonal
88. Id. at 1318.
89. See Mills, supra note 79, at 862 (analyzing the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit that
testimony based on research undertaken independently of litigation is reliable).
90. Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1319.
91. Id. at 1317.
92. Id. at 1318.
93. Id. at 1319. The Court commented that it had been presented with the experts'
qualifications, their conclusions, and their assertions that the methodology employed com-
ported with standard scientific procedures. The Ninth Circuit, however, concluded this was
insufficient under Daubert. Id.
94. Id. Dr. Palmer testified that he examined the medical records of the plaintiff's
children, and that to a reasonable medical and scientific certainty, Bendectin was taken at a
period of time so as to effect their development and cause their limb defects. Id.
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opinion, not science.",95
In applying the second prong of Rule 702, the relevance test, the Ninth
Circuit found that the plaintiff failed to show the expert scientific testi-
mony would assist the jury on the issue of causation. 96 The court looked
to the substantive tort law of California, which required that the plaintiffs
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Bendectin was the cause
of their injuries.97 Specifically, the plaintiffs were required to prove that
among children whose mothers ingested Bendectin, the incidence of limb
reduction defects more than doubled to more than two per thousand.98
The court concluded that none of the plaintiffs' experts, except Dr.
Palmer whose testimony was inadmissible under the first prong of Rule
702, testified that ingestion of Bendectin during pregnancy more than
doubled the risk of limb reduction defects.99 The Ninth Circuit held that
the evidence was inadmissible under the second prong of Rule 702 be-
cause it did not tend to support the plaintiffs' burden of proving causation
and would not be helpful to the trier of fact.' 00 Judge Kozinski reaf-
firmed the summary judgment granted by the district. court. 1 1
II. THE EFFECTS OF DAUBERT ON, ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
On remand, the Ninth Circuit established a precedent that if the ex-
pert's scientific evidence was not (1) created independent of litigation, (2)
subjected to peer review and publication, and (3) supported by testimony
that some objective source viewed the scientific methods acceptable, then
the admissibility of expert testimony is unlikely. 102 The effect of this pre-
cedent is unclear as members of the Ninth Circuit have not interpreted
the Supreme Court's analysis of Rule 702 in Daubert in the same
manner.10 3
However, if the Supreme Court had applied the framework it created
95. Id.
96. Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1320.
97. Id. at 1320.
98. Id. at 1320-21.
99. Id. at 1321.
100. Id. at 1322, 1320.
101. Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1322; see also Mills, supra note 79, at 866-77 (criticizing the
Ninth Circuit's faulty application of Rule 702).
102. Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1318.
103. See Mills, supra note 79, at 878-79 & n.205 (citing Hopkins v. Dow Coming Corp.,
33 F.3d 1116, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 1994) (admitting testimony that silicone breast implants
caused tissue disease under the Daubert standard; epidemiological studies, animal studies,
medical records and expert's experience as toxicologist were admitted)); United States v.
Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1152 (9th Cir. 1994) (admitting DNA evidence under Daubert and
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to the facts of Daubert, instead of remanding to a lower court, it is likely
that there would be less confusion regarding the actual intent of the
Court and the application of the reliability standard. 10 4  The Court
sketched a very broad framework, making it more difficult for trial court
judges to understand how to apply the reliability test." 5
A. The Effect of Daubert in the Federal Courts
An informal analysis of lower court opinions that cite to Daubert
through May 18, 1994,106 indicates that trial judges actively are assuming
their roles as "gatekeepers" by more carefully scrutinizing scientific evi-
dence."0 7 This analysis indicates that prior to Daubert, scientific testi-
mony by qualified experts in civil cases other than toxic tort litigation
rarely was excluded. Since Daubert, the trend appears to be for courts to
scrutinize more carefully and exclude evidence that may not have been
questioned in the past.10 8 For example, courts at the federal level are
more likely to utilize the "gatekeeper analysis" before admitting scientific
testimony in accident and product liability cases.10 9
asserting that the Daubert test is flexible and focuses on principles and methodology un-
derlying the evidence rather than on the conclusion generated).
104. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 598 (Rehnquist, C.J., with whom Justice Stevens joins,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) Chief Justice Rehnquist criticizes the holding of
the majority:
"General observations" by this Court customarily carry great weight with lower
federal courts, but the ones offered here suffer from the flaw common to most
such observations-they are not applied to deciding whether particular testimony
was or was not admissible, and therefore they tend to be not only general, but
vague and abstract. This is particularly unfortunate in a case such as this, where
the ultimate legal question depends on appreciation of one or more bodies of
knowledge not judicially noticeable, and subject to different interpretations in the
briefs of the parties and their amici.
Id.
105. Id.
106. Bernstein, supra note 79, at 3. See Linda Himelstein, Putting Science on Trial, Bus.
WEEK, Aug. 14, 1995, at 77 (referring to Mr. Bernstein's unpublished article studying the
impact of the Court's ruling and his conclusions that scientific evidence has been barred in
over two dozen cases since the ruling). Mr. Bernstein, a professor at the George Mason
University School of Law, is the author of several articles regarding the admissibility of
scientific evidence. Id. For a sampling of Mr. Bernstein's articles, consult The Admissibility
of Scientific Evidence after Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 15 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2139 (1994); David E. Bernstein & Peter W. Huber, Daubert Plaintiffs Won Technical
Battle But Plainly Lost the War, 21 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 16 (Summer-Fall
1993).
107. See Bernstein, supra note 79, at 3.
108. Id. at 6.
109. Id. In Stanczyk v. Black & Decker, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 565, 566-67 (N.D. II. 1993),
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The effect of the Daubert ruling also is apparent in criminal cases.
Courts have admitted evidence based on generally accepted forensic
techniques 10 such as photogrammetry and cocaine identification."' In
contrast, testimony based on polygraph evidence" 2 and voice identifica-
tion analysis" 3 both were held inadmissible. The lower courts have also
begun to apply the Daubert "gatekeeper analysis" to technical evidence
covered by Rule 702 that is not strictly scientific. In criminal cases, courts
have applied the Daubert analysis to evaluate expert testimony in cases
involving the possibility of arson, 1 4 money laundering,"15 the structure of
organized crime families," 6 and illegal drug marketing."17
In addition, cases involving testimony by psychological experts were
affected by Daubert.1 8 Since Daubert, the trend appears to be towards
greater exclusion of psychiatric and psychological testimony related to
child abuse and post-traumatic stress disorder." 9 Through the first part
the court excluded the expert testimony of a mechanical engineer regarding whether a saw
blade provided adequate protection because the expert offered no testable design to sup-
port his concept. In three other product liability and accident cases, the trial judge admit-
ted the expert testimony but only after the trial judge followed the gatekeeper's analysis.
See Robinson v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co.. 16 F.3d 1083, 1088-92 (10th Cir. 1994) (admitting
expert testimony regarding animation of accident); Chapple v. Ganger, 851 F. Supp. 1481,
1496-97 & n.14 (E.D. Wash. 1994)(admitting testimony by neurologist as to possibility of
full recovery of accident victim and impairment of earning capacity based on neurologists
personal observations of patients).
110. Bernstein, supra note 79, at 7-8 & n.25 (citing United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540
(6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191 (8th Cir. 1993); Government of
Virgin Islands v. Penn, 838 F. Supp. 1054 (D.V.I. 1993)); see also Springfield v. State, 860
P.2d 435 (Wyo. 1993).
111. Bernstein, supra note 79, at 8 (citing United States v. Quinn, 18 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir.
1994) (admitting testimony related to photogrammetry); United States v. Muldrow, 19 F.3d
1332 (10th Cir. 1994) (admitting cocaine identification techniques); United States v.
Bynum, 3 F.3d 769 (4th Cir. 1993) (admitting chromatogram)); see also State v. Hofer, 512
N.W.2d 482 (S.D. 1994) (admitting testimony related to intoxilyzer).
112. Bernstein, supra note 79, at 8 (citing United States v. Black, 831 F. Supp. 120, 122-
23 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)(holding that application of the Daubert analysis did not affect the pre-
cedent that results of polygraph tests are not sufficiently reliable to be admissible)).
113. Bernstein, supra note 79, at 8.
114. Id. at 10 (citing United States v. Markum, 4 F.3d 891 (10th Cir. 1993) (admitting
expert testimony)).
115. Id. at 8 (citing United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1993) (admitting
expert testimony)).
116. Id. (citing United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d. 924 (2d Cir. 1993) (admitting testi-
mony of expert)).
117. Id. (citing United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161 (1st Cir. 1993) (admitting testi-
mony to assess validity of methods used)).
118. Bernstein, supra note 79, at 8.
119. Id. (citing Gier v. Educational Serv. Unit No 16, 66 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 1995);
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of 1994, three courts excluded psychological and psychiatric evidence,
while only one court admitted testimony that related to the expert's
clinical experience with the patient and the prognosis for recovery.' 20
Initially, the effect of Daubert appeared to be a heightened sensitivity.,
to the court's role in monitoring the reliability and relevancy of expert
testimony. Many judges assumed an active role as the evidentiary "gate-
keeper" by carefully scrutinizing and weighing expert testimony. 12 1
More recent circuit court decisions, however, reflect an underlying ten-
sion as to exactly how and when the Daubert analysis will lead to the
inadmissibility of expert testimony. In March 1996, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district court's exclu-
sion of the plaintiff's experts in Holbrook v. Lykes Brothers Steamship
Co.,122 an asbestos exposure action. In Holbrook, a split three-judge
Third Circuit panel ruled that the testimony of a medical expert cannot
be excluded solely because the expert did not have the specialization the
court considered most appropriate.12 3 The court stated that it is an abuse
of discretion to exclude testimony simply because the trial court does not
deem the proposed expert to be the best qualified or because the pro-
posed expert does not have the specialization that the court considers
most appropriate. 124
Borawick v. Shay, 842 F. Supp. 1501 (D. Conn. 1993); see also State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d
192 (1993).
120. Id. (citing Doe v. Tag, Inc., 1993 WL 484212 (N.D. 11. 1993) (excluding testimony
related to child abuse accommodation syndrome)).
121. Id. at 13. Bernstein concludes that there can no longer be doubt regarding the
effect of Daubert:
It is clear that Daubert has ushered in a new era of judicial scrutiny of scientific
testimony and, more broadly, of expert evidence in general .... Since Daubert,
courts can no longer avoid the difficult business of carefully scrutinizing expert
testimony by reciting the conclusory fact that juries are ultimate triers of fact.
Id.
122. 80 F.3d 777, 788-89 (3d Cir. 1996).
123. Id. at 780, 782. In Holbrook, the plaintiff alleged that he had contracted mesothe-
lioma from exposure to asbestos. Id. at 777. The United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania excluded the testimony of the plaintiff's treating physician
with regard to the diagnosis or interpretation of the pathology report because the doctor
was not an oncologist or an expert in cancer diagnosis. Id. at 781. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated that:
It would be inconsistent with and run counter to the Rules' liberal policy of ad-
missibility to allow an outside expert, hired solely for litigation purposes, to rely
on and testify about a pathology report, but exclude testimony by the treating
physician who ordered the report and relied on it for life-and-death decisions
about the patient's treatment.
Id. at 782.
124. Id.
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Similarly, in Joiner v. General Electric Co. ,125 the United States Court,
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the trial court's exclusion of
expert testimony in a suit claiming that exposure to polychorinated bi-
phenyls ("PCBs") and their derivatives promoted the plaintiff's cancer-
ous condition.126 The Eleventh Circuit ruled that the experts utilized
scientifically reliable methods and procedures.1 27 The court also found
that the trial court's rejection of animal studies as unreliable was errone-
ous. 128 The court stated that opinions are
derived from individual pieces of evidence, each of which by it-
self might not be conclusive but when viewed in their entirety
are the building blocks of a perfectly reasonable conclusion, one
reliable enough to be submitted to a jury along with the test and
criticisms cross-examination and contrary evidence would
supply. 129
The dissent, however, argued that the reliability criteria of Daubert had
not been met. 130
In Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.,13 ' however, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that the plaintiff's expert testimony
on causation was inadmissible and failed the Daubert reliability test be-
cause the cardiologist's opinion did not possess "scientific rigor."' 32 The
court held that scientific evidence sought to be admitted must be "genu-
inely scientific, as distinct from being unscientific speculation offered by a
genuine scientist. Similarly, in Rutigliano v. Valley Business Forms,134
the United States District Court for New Jersey rejected the testimony of
a causation expert in a formaldehyde exposure action because the ex-
125. 78 F.2d 524 (11th Cir. 1996).
126. Id. at 528, 534.
127. Id. at 533-34. TWo experts conducted a comprehensive occupational medical as-
sessment and considered the testing and evaluation of toxic substances for carcinogenic
risk in humans. Id. at 531. The doctors utilized numerous studies and authorities. Id. The
experts discussed the studies of 13 researchers and utilized several World Health Organiza-
tion reports addressing whether PCBs cause cancer. Id. at 533.
128. Id. at 532.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 535-40.
131. 78 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1996). The Seventh Circuit held that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in determining that the deposition of the physician serving as an expert
witness for a smoker, who suffered a heart attack three days after he began using a nicotine
patch, and who subsequently sued the manufacturer of the patch, was not valid scientific
evidence admissible under Daubert. Id. at 319-20.
132. Id. at 319.
133. Id. at 318.
134. 929 F. Supp. 779, 791 (D.N.J. 1996).
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pert's theory of causation was not testable and failed the reliability prong
of Rule 702.135
The differences between the circuits indicate an underlying tension
concerning the standard of admissibility of evidence articulated by the
Court in Daubert. It is only through additional application of the
"gatekeeping" function and correction by the Supreme Court that clarifi-
cation of the reliability standard will be determined.
B. The Effect of Daubert at the State Level
Daubert has not had the same effect at the state level. Many states
continue to follow the Frye rule or some version of it.136 Courts in Mon-
tana, West Virginia, Louisiana, New Mexico, Wyoming, and Iowa
adopted the Daubert standard of admissibility of scientific evidence. 1
37
Some states have rejected the Daubert test. For example, New York,
Washington, Florida, and Arizona are following the more stringent "gen-
eral acceptance by the scientific community" test.138 The lower state
courts in Alaska, California, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, and Missouri
are following Frye until their state supreme courts decide which standard
to apply for the admissibility of expert testimony. 139 Because many states
adopt evidence codes similar to the federal rules, the reliability and rele-
135. Id.
136. Bernstein, supra note 79, at 11. New York, Washington, Florida, and Arizona
adopted the Frye standard. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. (citing People v. Wesley, 1994 WL 99513 (N.Y. 1994); State v. Riker, 869 P.2d
43 (Wash. 1994); see also State v. Jones, 863 P.2d 85 (Wash. App. 1993); cf. State v. Cissne,
865 P.2d 564 (Wash. App. 1994) (announcing intention to apply Frye until state supreme
court addressed the issue); Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 1993); see also Bass v.
Florida Dept. of Law Enforcement, 627 So. 2d. 1321 (1993); Eldridge v. Riddell, Inc., 626
So. 2d 232 (Fla. App. 1993) (concurring opinion); State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152 (Ariz.
1993)).
139. Bernstein, supra note 79, at 12 (citing McGlauflin v. State, 857 P.2d 366 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1993); People v. Leahy, 17 Cal. App. 4th 1796, 22 Cal. Rptr.2d 322 (Cal. App.
1993); People v. Watson, 629 N.E.2d (I11. App. 1994); People v. Mehlberg, 618 N.E.2d 1168
(Ill. App. 1993); Keene Corp. Inc. v. Hall, 626 A.2d 997 (Md. App. 1993); State v. Bauer,
512 N.W.2d 112 (Minn. App. 1994); State v. Goldenstein, 505 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. App.
1993); State v. Alt, 504 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. App. 1993); State v. Hill, 856 S.W.2d 702 (Mo.
App. 1993); State v. Davis, 860 S.W.2d 369 (Mo. App. 1993)).
Three state courts, North Dakota, New Hampshire, and Delaware are applying the state
codes of evidence to determine whether to admit scientific evidence even though the state
supreme courts of these states have recognized the standard articulated by the Supreme
Court in Daubert. Id. These states had rejected the Frye test before the Daubert decision.
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vancy criteria of Daubert can influence the state courts.14°
III. Is CONGRESSIONAL REVISION OF FEDERAL RULE OF
EVIDENCE 702 A SOLUTION?
A. The "Common Sense Legal Reforms Act"
On January 4, 1995, Congressman Henry J. Hyde, a Republican Repre-
sentative from Illinois, introduced the Common Sense Legal Reforms
Act of 1995 in the 104th Congress.'41 The goal of this legislation was to
reform the federal civil justice system.' 2 Section 102 of H.R. 10, entitled
"Honesty in Evidence," was a proposal to amend Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 702 and an attempt to codify the Supreme Court's decision in
Daubert. 1 3 Section 102 would amend Rule 702 by adding the following
new subsections:
(b) Adequate basis for opinion. Testimony in the form of an
opinion by a witness that is based on scientific knowledge shall
be inadmissible in evidence unless the court determines that
such opinion is
(1) based on scientifically valid reasoning; and
(2) sufficiently reliable so that the probative value of such
evidence outweighs the dangers specified in rule 403.
(c) Disqualification. Testimony by a witness who is qualified as
described in subsection (a) is inadmissible in evidence if such
witness is entitled to receive any compensation contingent on
the legal disposition of any claim with respect to which such tes-
140. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 146.
141. H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
142. Id. at 2.
143. Hearings, supra note 2, at 150. Section 102 of H.R. 10 has been described infor-
mally as an incorporation or codification of Daubert. However, careful analysis of Section
102 reveals that the proposed changes extend the intent of Daubert. For example, Franklin
M. Zweig, President of the Einstein Institute for Science, Health & the Courts, remarks:
[A] dispassionate assessment must observe that it goes way beyond the structur-
ing of standards for assuring the reliability of scientific evidence and testimony in
conduct of a judge's duty to screen the evidence. Section 102(b) is an entirely
different species of evidence law than the one currently applied by the federal
judiciary in the management of federal trials according to FRE 702, and its other
provisions. Current law assumes the admissibility of evidence, conditioned by
relevance proofs, exceptions, balancing tests, and other safeguards. Section
102(b) assumes the opposite. Section 102 turns off the scientific evidence faucet
by introducing into the federal rules an initial, a priori, rebuttable presumption of
scientific evidence's inadmissibility.
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timony is offered.144
The purpose of H.R. 10 was to provide "steps to restore efficiency, ac-
countability and fairness to our federal civil justice system.' 145 However,
the goal of restoring efficiency to the civil justice system is not new. In
1992, a subcommittee of President Bush's Competitiveness Committee
recommended revision of Rule 702 to incorporate a screening of the reli-
ability of expert testimony by federal judges.1 46 One of the purposes of
this proposal was to reduce the number of tort judgments against manu-
facturers, thereby increasing the competitiveness of American
companies.147
Similarly, Congressman Jim Ramstad claimed in his address to the
House Judiciary Subcommittee, that the goal of the Common Sense Legal
Reforms Act of 1995 was to curb abuses in the legal system which hurt
the international competitiveness of United States businesses.' 4  For ex-
ample, Representative Ramstad stated that tort costs have grown almost
four times faster than the United States economy during the period of
1933 to 1991.149
The text of proposed 702 also became part of H.R. 988, which was enti-
tled, "A Bill to Reform the Federal Civil Justice System.'15 0 H.R. 988
was introduced by Congressman Carlos J. Moorhead of California and
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. 5' Section 3 of H.R. 988 enti-
tled "Honesty in Evidence" is similar to the text of H.R. 702 except for
the addition of section (d), which adds that the proposed changes do not
apply to criminal proceedings. 152
144. Common Sense Legal Reforms Act of 1995, 104th Cong., 102 (1995).
145. Hearings, supra note 2, at 19.
146. Gottesman, supra note 10, at 1861 (citing Proposed Civil Justice Reform Legisla-
tion: Proposed Legislation: Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America, 60 U. CIN. L. REV.
979, 999 (1992)).
147. Id. at 1861-62.
148. Hearings, supra note 2, at 19.
149. Id. "A 1991 study by Tillinghast, a prominent actuarial consulting firm, estimated
the direct cost of the tort system at $132 billion in 1991." Id. Other studies indicate that the
United States spends about $300 billion if indirect costs, such as federal and state court
costs and value of time lost, is included. The Tillinghast study also estimated that U.S. tort
cases rose by a factor of almost 400, between 1933 and 1991. Approximately 20 million
civil lawsuits were filed in both state and federal courts in 1992. Id.
150. Attorney Accountability Act of 1995, H.R. 988, 104th Cong. 3 (1996).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 3-4. Section 3 of H.R. 988 states:
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (28 U.S.C. App.) is amended -
(1) by inserting "(a) IN GENERAL." before "If",
and
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On January 21, 1997, S. 79 entitled, "Civil Justice Fairness Act of 1997,"
was introduced into the 105th Congress.153 Section 302, "Honesty in Evi-
dence," parallels the legislation which was introduced in the 104th Con-
gress but failed to become law.' 54 There are two distinguishing factors in
(2) by adding at the end the following:
"(b) ADEOUATE BASIS FOR OPINION. Testimony in the form of an opinion by a
witness that is based on scientific knowledge shall be inadmissible in evidence
unless the court determines that such opinion-["]
"(1) is scientifically valid and reliable;["]
"(2) has a valid scientific connection to the fact it is offered to prove; and["]
"(3) is sufficiently reliable so that the probative value of such evidence out-
weighs the dangers specified in rule 403.["]
"(c) DISQUALIFICATION. Testimony by a witness who is qualified as described in
subdivision (a) is inadmissible in evidence if the witness is entitled to receive any
compensation contingent on the legal disposition of any claim with respect to
which the testimony is offered.["]
"(d) SCOPE. Subdivision (b) does not apply to criminal proceedings.["].
Id. at 3-4.
153. S. 79, 105th Cong. 1st Sess. (1997).
154. Id. The pertinent parts of Section 302(B) of S. 79 state:
(B) Adequate Basis for Opinion
(1) Testimony in the form of an opinion by a witness that is based on scien-
tific, technical or medical knowledge shall be inadmissible in evidence unless
the court determines that such opinion
(A) is based on scientifically valid reasoning;
(B) is sufficiently reliable so that the probative value of such evidence outweighs
the dangers specified in Rule 403;
and
(C) the techniques, methods, and theories used to formulate that opinion are
generally accepted within the relevant scientific, medical or technical field.
(2) In determining whether an opinion satisfies conditions in paragraphs (1),
the Court shall consider
(A) whether the opinion and any theory on which it is based have been.
experimentally tested;
(B) whether the opinion has been published in peer-review literature;
and
(C) whether the theory or techniques supporting the opinion are suffi-
ciently reliable and valid to warrant their use as support for the prof-
fered opinion.
(C) Expertise in the field. Testimony in the form of an opinion by a witness
that is based on scientific, technical, or medical knowledge shall be inadmissi-
ble in evidence unless the witness's knowledge, skill, experience, training,
education, or other expertise lies in the particular field about which such
witness is testifying.
(D) Disqualification. Testimony by a witness who is qualified as described in
subsection (A) is inadmissible in evidence if such witness is entitled to re-
ceive any compensation contingent on the legal disposition of any claim with
respect to which such testimony is offered.
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the new Senate version of the bill. First, S. 79 is written broadly to apply
to "scientific, technical or medical knowledge" rather than opinion testi-
mony based only on scientific knowledge.' 55 Second, S. 79 includes a
provision that requires the court to consider "whether the opinion has
been published in peer-review literature.' '15 6
B. The Position of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on
Evidence Rules
In 1934, Congress adopted the Rules Enabling Act' 57 which clarified
the appropriate roles of the courts and Congress in revising rules of evi-
dence and civil procedure. 158 The Rules Enabling Act provided that the
Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules governing the
district courts and the courts of appeals. 159 Rules creating, abolishing, or
modifying a federal rule of evidence are to be approved by an act of Con-
gress.160 This procedure ensures that proposed revisions and changes are
subject to public comment and widespread examination by judges, prac-
ticing lawyers, and law professors. 161
In 1993, Chief Justice Rehnquist appointed members to serve on the
Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules with the
purpose of reviewing the Federal Rules of Evidence. 62 Public meetings
155. Id. § 302(B)(1).
156. Id. § 302(B)(2)(B).
157. The Rules Enabling Act of 1934 is a federal statute that delegated rulemaking
authority to the Supreme Court. Today this statute is located at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1332 (6th ed. 1990).
158. Attorney Accountability, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellec-
tual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 191 (1995) (testimony by
David C. Weiner, Attorney, Hahn, Loeser & Parks, Cleveland, Ohio) [hereinafter Hear-
ings I1]. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-74 (1994).
159. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) and Commentary on 1988 and 1990 Revisions.
160. Id. § 2074. Section 2074 prescribes the final step in the rulemaking process:
(a) The Supreme Court shall transmit to the Congress not later than May 1 of the
year in which a rule prescribed under section 2072 is to become effective a copy of
the proposed rule. Such rule shall take effect no earlier than December 1 of the
year in which such rule is so transmitted ...
(b) Any such rule creating, abolishing, or modifying an evidentiary privilege shall
have no force or effect unless approved by Act of Congress.
Id.
161. See Letter from Judge Ralph K. Winter, U.S. Ct. of App., Chr. of the Advisory
Comm. of Evidence Rules, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference of the U.S., to the Hon. Henry J. Hyde, Chr., House Comm. on the Judiciary,
104th Cong., 3 (Feb. 7, 1995) [hereinafter Letter]. See also Hearings, supra note 2, at 189-
90.
162. Letter, supra note 161.
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were conducted on May 9-10, 1994 and October 17-18, 1994 to discuss the
Federal Rules of Evidence regarding expert testimony. 163 The Commit-
tee concluded that adoption of the proposed amendment to Rule 702
contained in H.R. 10 [proposed Rule 702] would be "counter-
productive."1 64
The rationale for opposing the adoption of proposed Rule 702 centered
on the view that there had not been sufficient time to assess the effect of
the decision of the Supreme Court in Daubert.165 The Committee be-
lieved that a valid assessment could only be made after more experience
had been acquired applying the Daubert criteria. In addition, the Com-
mittee asserted that it would be unnecessary to attempt to codify Daubert
when it is already "the law of the land.' 1 66
Additionally, there was great concern by the Judicial Conference Com-
mittee on the Rules of Evidence that proposed Rule 702 did not accu-
rately codify Daubert. Proposed Rule 702 drew a distinction between the
"validity" and the "reliability" of scientific evidence. 167 Under proposed
Rule 702, the judge is first required to make a determination of whether
the opinion is valid. 168 This distinction between validity and reliability
was not made by the Supreme Court in Daubert and is likely to cause
additional confusion regarding the requirements of Rule 702.169
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. Judge Winter served as the Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Evidence
Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States. His February 7, 1995 letter to Con-
gressman Hyde stated:
The committee unanimously concluded that amendment of Rule 702 would be
counterproductive at this time in light of the recent decision of the Supreme
Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993). It is yet too early
to determine whether Daubert curbs abuses in the use of expert testimony. A
valid assessment of its effects can only be made after courts acquire more experi-
ence with it. The committee will continue to study the operation and effect of the
rule as construed under Daubert by the courts.
Id.
166. Letter, supra note 161. Judge Winter emphasized that: "Daubert is now the law of
the land. Restating the Court's opinion, even if drafted accurately, is unnecessary. But
Rule 702(b) as proposed in H.R. 10 does not accurately codify Daubert. And if enacted
would cause mischief." Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1-2.
169. Id. In the letter to the House Judiciary Committee, Judge Winter, Chairman of the
Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, stated that:
This new requirement imposes an ill-defined burden on the courts. Indeed, it is
difficult to see how scientific evidence can be "reliable" and yet not be "valid."
The uncertainties created by the requirements could cause significant problems,
1997]
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Proposed Rule 702 also would restrict the scope of the rule to an opin-
ion by a witness that is based on "scientific knowledge" 170 and does not
encompass a broader field of specialized knowledge. However, Rule 702
is not limited to scientific knowledge but also encompasses "scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge.' 1 71 In fact, lower courts have
applied the Daubert "gatekeeping" interpretation of Rule 702 to a broad
range of specialized knowledge such as economics, statistics, and
accounting. 1
72
The proposed Rule 702 would also reverse the underlying intent of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.' 73 Specifically, the language in proposed
Rule 702 reverses the intent of Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which the
Supreme Court in Daubert applied to Rule 702 evidence. 174 In Daubert,
the Court cautioned that in assessing expert scientific testimony under
Rule 702, the judge also must consider Rule 403.17' This rule excludes
relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
particularly for prosecutors who often rely heavily on "scientific evidence" in es-
tablishing the guilt of defendants.
Id.
170. Id. at 2.
171. FED. R. EVID. 702.
172. Bernstein, supra note 79, at 10.
173. Hearings II, supra note 158, at 164 (statement of Anthony Z. Roisman, Counsel,
Cohen, Milstein, Hausfed & Toll). Roisman strongly argued against adoption to Section
102 of H.R. 10:
[Piroposed Section 102 runs contrary to basic principles which are vitally impor-
tant to our civil justice system and to the goals of the American public. First, it
centralizes power in the federal bureaucracy by shifting the focus of decision from
the public, functioning as jurors, to a handful of government officials appointed
for life. Second, it reverses the underlying premise of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence that, absent some strong evidence to the contrary, all relevant evidence
should be heard by the jury who will make the final decision in the case. Third, it
adds confusion to the federal courts thereby increasing the work of federal judges
and slowing down the process of resolving disputes. Finally, there is no scientifi-
cally reliable evidence to support the changes proposed in Section 102. If, the
Congress is to be properly concerned that decisions in individual cases in federal
courts should be based upon reliable scientific evidence, then Congress should
itself insist that reliable scientific evidence support any major changes in the civil
justice system, particularly where the effect of those changes is to narrow the
constitutionally protected right to trial by jury.
Id. at 6-7.
174. Letter, supra note 161, at 2. "The proposed Rule 702(b) would also reverse the
present Evidence Rule 403 balancing test, which Daubert expressly applies to Rule 702
testimony." Id.
175. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. "Throughout, a judge assessing a proffer of expert scien-
tific testimony under Rule 702 should also be mindful of other applicable rules .... Rule
403 permits the exclusion of relevant evidence 'if its probative value is substantially out-
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the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the
jury.' 176 Proposed Rule 702 reverses the balancing test in Rule 403, how-
ever, by requiring that the opinion be "'sufficiently reliable so that the
probative value of such evidence outweighs the dangers specified in Rule
403.",177
In addition, the' proposed Rule 702 reverses the balancing test for only
scientific evidence. 178 Under the proposed change to Rule 702, other
types of technical or specialized expert testimony would continue to be
evaluated under Rule 403.179 There appears to be no rationale for apply-
ing different balancing tests. 180
Section 102 of H.R. 10 also would add a new Evidence Rule 702(c)
which excludes testimony from an expert who is "entitled to receive any
compensation contingent on the legal disposition of any claim with re-
spect to which such testimony is offered." 18' This provision is redundant,
as contingent fee expert testimony is already barred in most jurisdictions
by the American Bar Association Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility.' 8 2 It is also unclear what the effect of proposed Rule 702(c) would
be with respect to pro bono cases that are regulated by more than 2,000
fee-shifting statutes, and that, in some instances, provide for expert wit-
ness fees. 1
8 3
Another commentator claims that the rule changes proposed in H.R.
10 demonstrate the problems of "political interference in the rulemaking
process and the ineptness of the result that political rulemaking can pro-
duce."'" If Congress believes that codification of Daubert is important,
then Congress can recommend that the Judicial Conference give this im-
mediate attention. An appropriate procedure for formulation and adop-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury
.. Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 403)
176. FED. R. EVID. 403




181. H.R. 10, 104th Cong. (1995).
182. Hearings II, supra note 158, at 190 (citing ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-109(c) and MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Rule
3.4(b). In those courts where this practice is permitted, cross-examination is also permit-
ted. (citing United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984) (bias impeachment permitted under
Federal Rules of Evidence)). Id. See Letter, supra note 161, at 2 (expressing uncertainty
regarding the effects of Rule 702 on the regulation of contingent fee expert testimony).
183. Hearings II, supra note 158, at 190.
184. Id. The American Bar Association supports delegating rulemaking authority to
the Judicial Conference. Id.
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tion of rules of evidence was created by Congress.185 Under the Rules
Enabling Act, the United States Judicial Conference drafts the rules,
which are then exposed to thorough public comment and considera-
tion.186 These rules are then submitted to the United States Supreme
Court for consideration and promulgation.' 87 Finally, rule changes are
submitted to Congress for veto before any rule takes effect. 8 8 This time-
proven process should be followed for changes to Rule 702.
IV. CONCLUSION
Clearly there is much controversy and confusion regarding what is, and
what should be, the standard for the admissibility of expert evidence and
how that standard should be applied under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
Consequently, it is not surprising that many solutions for change will be
proposed.
However, it is too soon to amend Rule 702 as proposed in Section 103
of H.R. 10. The warning of Chief Justice Rehnquist that "the unusual
subject matter should cause us to proceed with great caution" in deciding
how Rule 702 should be applied,' 89 must be heeded. Questions will con-
tinue to arise as district court judges attempt to apply Daubert to deter-
mine the admissibility of scientific testimony. Further developments in
the application of Rule 702 are best left for judicial decisions in future
cases challenging the admissibility of expert testimony. Although the
Federal Rules of Evidence technically do not apply to state courts, which
currently manage more than ninety-five percent of the cases filed in the
185. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-74 (1994) (expressly delegating rulemaking authority to the Ju-
dicial Conference). See Hearings II, supra note 158, at 189-90. The American Bar Associa-
tion, in its January 1982 Resolution, adopted by the House of Delegates, urged Congress to
enact legislation that delegated rulemaking authority to the Judicial Conference. Id. at 190.
Furthermore, this procedure preserves the doctrine of separation of powers:
Rules of evidence and procedure are inherently a matter of intimate concern to
the judiciary, which must apply them on a daily basis;
Each rule forms just one part of a complicated, interlocking whole, rendering due
deliberation and public comment essential, otherwise the impact of any rule may
be quite different in quality or force than that which was intended; and
The Judicial Conference is in a unique position to draft rules with care in a setting
isolated from pressures that may interfere with painstaking consideration and due
deliberation.
Id. at 190. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073.
186. Hearings 11, supra note 158, at 189.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 190.
189. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 599 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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United States, 9 ° development of a federal model for the admissibility of
expert testimony will influence rules adopted at the state level. Thus, a
change in Rule 702 is likely to have a great impact.
For these reasons, the proposed Congressional amendments to Rule
702 should not be adopted. The rulemaking process established under
the Rules Enabling Act should be followed for revision of evidence rules
governing the admission of expert testimony in civil and criminal cases.
Nancy S. Farrell
190. Hearings, supra note 2, at 146.
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